To meet the demand for carbon emission reduction under the new situation, the “14th Five-Year Plan” and the report of the “20th National Congress” explicitly proposed to “implement a system that is mainly based on the control of carbon emission intensity, supplemented by the control of the total amount of carbon emissions” (hereinafter referred to as the “total amount and intensity control”), which sets a clear target for the reconstruction of the carbon emission rights market trading mechanism in the “dual carbon” era. How to effectively design a carbon emission rights market trading mechanism under the dual control of total amount and intensity has become a major practical problem that needs to be urgently solved. This paper investigates the optimal carbon emission rights market trading mechanism under the dual control of total quantity and intensity by constructing a two-stage game model of the government-enterprise, on the basis of which it discusses the difference in the effect of the optimal carbon emission rights market trading mechanism under the dual control mode of total quantity and intensity and the traditional single control mode of total quantity and intensity. Compared with the literature, the contributions of this paper are as follows: different from the previous literature on the single-total control or single-intensity control mode, it innovatively combines the total quantity and intensity control modes, explores the mechanism of the total quantity and intensity dual control targets on the production and emission reduction of enterprises, and constructs a carbon emission trading game model under the dual control of total quantity and intensity, enriching and perfecting the existing theory of carbon emission trading; identify the important factors affecting the design of the carbon emission trading mechanism under the dual control of total quantity and intensity, and provides a theoretical basis for the design of China's carbon emission trading mechanism in the era of "dual carbon"; analyze the effects of the carbon emission trading mechanism under the dual control of total quantity and intensity from the levels of consumer surplus, environment, profit and social welfare. The conclusions are as follows: First, the impacts of aggregate and intensity targets on firms’ output decisions are consistent, but there are differences in the impacts on firms' abatement decisions. With the tightening of both total and intensity control targets, the optimal output of enterprises continues to decline. As the total control target tightens, the optimal level of corporate emission reduction increases; as the intensity control target tightens, the optimal level of corporate emission reduction decreases. Second, under the dual-control model of total quantity and intensity, the degree of marginal environmental damage and emission reduction efficiency affect the design of the optimal carbon emissions trading mechanism. As the marginal environmental damage rises, the total control and intensity control targets should be gradually tightened, the allocation of carbon emission rights shows a downward trend, and the carbon emission rights market trading price shows an upward trend. As the efficiency of emission reduction increases, the total amount of control target should be gradually tightened, the intensity control target should be gradually increased, and the allocation of carbon emission rights and the trading price of carbon emission rights in the carbon emission rights market should decrease. Finally, compared with the single total and single intensity control modes, the carbon emission rights market trading mechanism under the dual total and intensity control mode can achieve a win - win situation for both the environment and the economy. The consumer surplus and corporate profits under the dual-control model are greater than those under the single-cap model, while the degree of environmental damage is lower than that under the single-intensity model, thus maximizing the level of social welfare and achieving a win-win situation for both the economy and the environment. The findings of this paper can provide relevant ideas for the construction of China’s carbon emission rights market in the “dual-carbon” era.