In the context of developing low-carbon circular economy, the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain has become an important operation mode for enterprises to help achieve the goal of carbon neutrality and promote the low-carbon cycle transformation of the industrial chain, and governments around the world have implemented financial subsidy policies to encourage enterprises to carry out emission reduction and waste product recycling and remanufacturing activities. At the same time, the overall cohesion has become the core competitiveness of the supply chain with the intensification of competition among supply chains, and enterprises have the motivation of altruistic behavior. However, altruism as a psychological preference is private information, and there may be intentional concealment or camouflage of altruism according to whether it is advantageous, that is, altruistic information between parties is usually asymmetrical. Thus, considering whether altruistic information is symmetrical or asymmetrical, it is realistic to introduce government subsidy and member enterprises’ altruism into the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain decision-making research. The conclusions of this paper are of great significance for guiding the government to formulate subsidy strategies, the member enterprises of the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain to make decisions and carry out altruistic practices scientifically, and to achieve long-term sustainable development under the joint action of internal and external incentive mechanisms.In this paper, the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain is taken as the research object. Considering the leading retailer’s altruism and the government’s emission reduction and recycling subsidies, tripartite differential game models of the government and enterprises are constructed based on the long-term dynamic perspective under the environment of information symmetry and asymmetry. The feedback dynamic equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer, retailer and government are solved under four altruistic information scenarios: information symmetry and retailer self-interest, information symmetry and retailer altruism, information asymmetry and retailer self-interest and information asymmetry and retailer altruism, and the research method of mathematical derivation combined with numerical analysis is used to reveal the effects of different altruistic information scenarios on the equilibrium strategies of the member enterprises and the government. On this basis, this paper focuses on the selection of altruistic information strategies for the retailer and manufacturer. The conclusions are as follows: Under information symmetry, the retailer’s excessive altruism is “altruistic but self-harming”, while moderate altruism is an “altruistic and self-beneficial” positive behavior. Under information asymmetry, moderate altruism is still an “altruistic and self-beneficial” positive behavior, but when the manufacturer’s estimated altruistic degree is small, the retailer’s excessive altruism may also become an “altruistic and self-beneficial” positive behavior. This positive behavior can increase their partners’ profits while increasing their own profits, which can significantly improve the overall profits of the supply chain, in addition, it can significantly increase consumer surplus and social welfare, and help partners obtain more government subsidies. Under information asymmetry, regardless of whether the retailer is altruistic or not, the wholesale price will increase with the increase of the manufacturer’s estimated altruistic degree, but the manufacturer’s emission reduction and recycling efforts, retail price, goodwill and recycling rate will not be affected. In addition, the more the manufacturer overestimates the retailer’s altruism, the more beneficial it is to the manufacturer, the more unfavorable it is to the retailer and the total supply chain.With the increase of the true altruistic degree of the retailer, the government’s optimal emission reduction and recycling subsidy rates will decrease, but the total subsidy expenditure will first increase and then decrease under the information symmetry or asymmetry. Under information asymmetry, the government’s optimal emission reduction and recycling subsidy rates, the total subsidy expenditure will both decrease with the increase of the manufacturer’s estimated altruistic degree, but the consumer surplus and social welfare will not be affected by it.Under information asymmetry, the manufacturer always tends to overestimate the retailer’s altruism to obtain more profits. To achieve the goal of “altruistic and self-beneficial”, the retailer should maintain an appropriate altruistic degree under information symmetry. Under information asymmetry, the retailer either maintains an appropriate altruistic degree, or hides the true information and devalues the altruistic degree to the manufacturer. Pretending to be altruistic is most disadvantageous when the retailer itself is self-interested, and the true message must be conveyed to the manufacturer. When the retailer is altruistic, whether the true altruistic information is transmitted to the manufacturer depends on the relationship between its true altruistic degree and the manufacturer’s estimated altruistic degree, the retailer should hide the true information and devalue its own altruistic degree to the manufacturer.