The development of new energy automobile industry has become a national strategy and social consensus, which is of great significance in promoting regional economic development, economic structure transformation and upgrading, and reaching the goal of “double carbon”. Intelligent and networked new energy vehicles have brought convenience and speed to travel, and more and more consumers have begun to favor new energy vehicles. However, with the increasing penetration of new energy vehicles, new energy vehicles relying on complex hardware and software systems are prone to quality defects, and like traditional fuel vehicles, new energy vehicles are also facing the problem of defective product recalls.Compared with traditional fuel vehicles, new energy vehicles have a higher degree of intelligent networking. Complex hardware and software systems give new energy vehicle manufacturers an absolute information advantage, both in the automotive market and in the recall process. New energy vehicle manufacturers can gain excessive returns through information asymmetry, while uninformed vehicle owners suffer losses. Reducing information asymmetry in the recall process is essential for the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle industry. Manufacturer-initiated recalls can minimize information asymmetry, but they also face high recall costs, and in the absence of external monitors, manufacturers will choose to conceal information about quality defects. However, existing studies mainly focus on the study of manufacturers′ behavior in the recall process, and the game relationship between parties in the automotive recall process has rarely been mentioned. Therefore, this study combines finite rationality and information asymmetry to study the recall process in the new energy vehicle market, and proposes effective measures to reduce information asymmetry and promote the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle industry. the first part, the current situation of the new energy vehicle industry, the background of the study and the general framework are introduced. In the second part, the interests of each recall participating subject are analyzed. In the third part, firstly, taking information asymmetry as the entry point, a three-party evolutionary game model involving manufacturers, government and the public is constructed. Secondly, the three-party benefit matrix is calculated, the strategy game phase diagram is constructed, and the model is solved and the corresponding conclusions are obtained. Further, the three-party evolutionary dynamics system is established, and the equilibrium strategy analysis is based on Jacobian matrix to obtain the stability conditions of the equilibrium point. Finally, four possible evolutionary paths in the initial stage, developmental stage and maturity stage are simulated. In the fourth part, numerical simulation is used to explore the evolution paths of the system under different combinations of initial strategies, and sensitivity analysis is conducted on the efforts of the government and the public to reduce information asymmetry. In the fifth part, the research conclusions of this paper are drawn and policy recommendations are made.The following conclusions and managerial insights are obtained from this study. I. Manufacturers consider strategy selection more from a cost-benefit perspective, and only if it is more in line with the long-term profitability of new energy vehicle manufacturers, manufacturers will choose active recall strategies to reduce market information asymmetry. The main purpose of government regulation is to guide manufacturers to initiate recalls. Whether or not the public participates in the regulation depends on the asymmetric information in the market, and the public will participate in the regulation when the public interest is jeopardized. Manufacturers should focus on brand building, abandon short-term thinking, and aim for capital market returns and long-term market returns as the goal of corporate development. The government should focus on guiding rather than penalizing, and support the development of the new energy vehicle industry by providing incentives instead of penalties, with industry support and policy support as the main focus. The public should actively defend their rights and voice their opinions, respond to quality defects to the regulatory authorities, safeguard their rights and interests, and reduce market information asymmetry.　In conclusion, this study uses the theory of finite rationality to construct an evolutionary game model to study the information asymmetry in the recall process of new energy vehicles, which provides a new idea for the regulation of new energy vehicle recalls, and the conclusions obtained can provide a theoretical basis for the healthy development of the new energy vehicle industry.